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bstract: In this essay, I explore the ambiguity of the com­
petition’s title “Constitutions as Chains”, and distinguish 
between two intergenerational challenges in constitu­
tion­making: the challenge of intergenerationally just 
constitutional provisions, and the challenge of creating a stable in­
stitution which is accepted by successive generations. I prioritise the 
latter. After contrasting classic ideas of Burke and Paine, I discuss 
different ways of addressing the challenge, such as the amendability of 
a constitution, eternity clauses or recurring constitutional assemblies. 
A flexible approach towards existing constitutional provisions, which 
is open to future developments, gets the nod. However, a need for 
empirical research remains.
Introduction1
“Constitutions as chains” is an ambiguous metaphor.2 It allows for 
at least two interpretations to characterise constitution-making.
The first interpretation carries a negative connotation: it is the in-
terpretation of constitutions as fetters.3 Ideally, society commits 
itself in a “sober” state to certain rules. The aim is to prevent itself 
from carrying out actions in a “drunken” state that it will regret 
when “sober” again. Odysseus is seen as the archetype of such prac-
tice. He has his companions tie him to the ship’s mast. Thus, he 
can listen to the sirens without falling for their call.4 A problem 
arises if fetters are not self-imposed. This is a classic puzzle in con-
stitutional theory: one generation claims a freedom for itself which 
it simultaneously denies a successive generation. We can call this 
the paradox of constitution-making.5 If we now think of gener-
ations as different actors, autonomy can turn into heteronomy.6
The second interpretation carries a positive connotation, and can 
be understood as a response to the aforementioned paradox: re-
curring constitutional assemblies could renew a constitution’s le-
gitimacy, or decide on a new constitution. Constitutions would 
form a chain, connected through assemblies. This is not exactly 
the idea that underlies the legal concept of a “legitimation chain” 
(Legitimationskette) in representative democracy;7 still, this inter-
pretation points to the necessity of a constant renewal of a consti-
tution’s democratic foundation. 
The metaphor of “constitutions as fetters” has rhetorical force, and 
the idea of “legitimation chains” offers an interesting response. In 
order to assess the fit of problem and proposed solution, we need 
to elaborate on both. I begin by distinguishing two intergenera-
tional challenges in constitution-making. Building on classic texts 
by Burke and Paine, I turn to what characterises a constitution 
as a legal institution and how it exerts its influence. Against this 
background, I go on to discuss different possible reactions to the 
intergenerational challenge. I see the best possible reaction in a 
rational, not overly restrictive, approach to constitutional bound-
aries and change mechanisms. Still, which approach to constitu-
tion-making is most likely to be successful, remains an empirical 
question.
A
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For legal examples, I rely on the German Constitution, the Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz), as this is the legal material I am most familiar 
with. However, I do believe – albeit cautiously – that the argu-
ments put forth in this essay apply more generally. But there are 
at least two caveats. First, institutions arise and function under 
conditions specific to a certain society. There is no one-size-fits-all 
approach. Second, constitutions in authoritarian regimes do not 
bind power in the same way, and they pose challenges that I do 
not address in this essay.8
Two intergenerational challenges
The intergenerational challenge of constitution-making consists 
of at least two specific sub-challenges. Their common denomi-
nator is uncertainty on the part of the current, acting generation: 
knowledge about our successors is necessarily incomplete.
Intergenerational justice
The first intergenerational challenge concerns the question of in-
tergenerational justice directly. If we assume an ethical obligation 
to preserve the action space of the following generations, how 
should we account for this obligation in material constitutional 
provisions? This question relates to the preservation (or augmen-
tation) of resources, which can be natural resources, but also ma-
terial wealth. Indeed, for Thomas Jefferson the rights of successive 
generations were closely related to the question of national debt.9 
And today, provisions requiring a balanced budget are discussed 
and employed as instruments of intergenerational justice.10 In the 
German case, apart from budget provisions, article 20a Basic Law 
refers directly to successive generations. According to this provi-
sion, “the state shall protect the natural foundations of life and 
animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, 
by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the 
constitutional order.”11 A provision that addresses intergenera-
tional justice generally and apart from matters of environmental 
protection does not exist, but has been discussed.12 While there 
already are traces of intergenerational justice provisions, promi-
nently Peter Häberle still sees a great – and global – potential in 
this regard.13
Stability
The other challenge concerns the stability of the constitution 
as an institution, meaning its enduring recognition and accept-
ance. From the perspective of generational ethics, institutions – 
including constitutions – are “cultural capital”, but it is unclear 
whether such capital is a positive heritage or a negative burden.14 
The metaphor of “constitutions as fetters” has rhetorical 
force, and the idea of “legitimation chains” offers an 
interesting response.
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Experimental character
Every democratic constitution is a big experiment. Pratap Bhanu 
Mehta discusses the biggest experiment of this kind: the dem-
ocratic constitution of India.23 He describes the manifold chal-
lenges involved as “manifestations of one single challenge: how to 
create citizens bound by a sense of reciprocity”.24 In the moment 
of constitution-making, it is unclear whether a sense of common 
civility will arise. Constitution-makers can only hope so and try 
their best to create institutions that make this possible. This im-
plies potential fallacies and mistakes. Necessarily, the knowledge 
with which constitution-makers operate is incomplete.25 A “sa-
cralisation” is not compatible with this perspective. The possibil-
ity of being wrong about a choice of constitutional design rather 
leads to a respectful, but rational approach to constitutional doc-
uments.
Further, if we account for the experimental character of constitu-
tion-making, it does not come as a surprise that most constitu-
tions do not endure. Although created for “eternity”, only half of 
them last more than 19 years.26 Areas of law with a much more 
modest claim to longevity seem to endure much longer. In the 
German context, this is captured in the classic statement by the 
leading figure of German administrative law, Otto Mayer. The 
new edition of his German textbook came out just after a world 
war, a revolution and the enactment of a new constitution. Still, 
the preface stated that there was not much new to report: “’Con-
stitutional law passes, administrative law remains’; this has already 
been observed elsewhere.”27
In the following, I contrast (mainly) two classic positions on con-
stitution-making.
Edmund Burke’s eternal society
Edmund Burke understood the constitution as an intergenera-
tional contract.28 In itself this conception is not helpful. A con-
tract has at least two parties. In case of a breach, a party can sue. 
This means that one party can turn to a third party that will fa-
cilitate enforcement. However, generations do not come together 
as parties; there is no reciprocal relationship.29 And more impor-
tantly, a constitution lacks an external authority that guarantees 
enforcement.30 One might think of a constitutional court, but a 
constitutional court also depends on the acceptance and recog-
nition of its judgements and has — apart from its slowly built 
legitimacy31 — no mechanism to enforce its decisions. 
Burke’s conception turns comprehensible if a higher – or natural 
– order beyond positive law is invoked. In his pamphlet32 against 
the French Revolution, Burke elaborates on his position:
Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of 
mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure – but the 
state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partner­
ship agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, [...] and to be dis­
solved by the fancy of the parties. [...] because it is not a partner­
ship in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a 
temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; 
The success of a constitution, i.e. whether it creates a stable en-
vironment for civil15 society, will ultimately depend on successive 
generations. From such an angle, the second challenge has prior-
ity over the first. Insofar as acceptance of a constitution depends 
on its contents, an interrelation exists. One could also argue that 
the obligation to endow them as far as possible with functioning 
institutions is also among the obligations towards successive gen-
erations, and that the functioning of an institution includes the 
option to adapt it to current circumstances.
Constitutional designers are well aware of these challenges. They 
want to take precautionary measures to make a constitution’s en-
durance more likely. To this end, they need a workable descriptive 
conception of how a constitution functions.
What characterises a constitution?
A constitution functions in multiple ways. Emphasising one al-
most necessarily means neglecting another. Still, in the following 
I will focus on some of the aspects I deem essential.
Creating identity
A prominent function of a constitution can be to create a col-
lective identity. A group might constitute itself as such through 
a constitution. The constitution offers a common point of ref-
erence. Such a legal constituting process might be preceded by a 
prelegal conception. Examples are ethnicities or nations.16 How-
ever, such a prelegal conception is not a necessary condition. The 
sober idea of “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotis-
mus)17 does not presuppose a narrow conception of a nation. 
If the identity of a group is created, or reinforced, by a constitu-
tion, the relationship to the constitution is a peculiar one. A prob-
lem might arise when reverence turns into sacralisation.18 This 
obscures the view on the possible need for reform. Horst Dreier 
gives an impressive account of this danger, and names examples 
where normative “petrification” may occur. In the German con-
text, this is the role of the states on the federal level, certain aspects 
of the rule of law, and the reluctance to make use of direct-demo-
cratic instruments.19 Risks of petrification give cause for concern.
Generational imprint
Constitutions have a practical everyday function: they create 
boundaries for government and shield matters from politics. They 
state what can be determined politically and what cannot. Thus, 
minorities are protected from majorities, and “fragile democra-
cies” protect themselves against the reopening of particularly sen-
sitive chapters of political bargaining.20 Traumatic experiences can 
play a strong role in drawing these boundaries. In this sense, the 
description of a constitution as an intergenerational document 
must be qualified. A constitution might matter for several gen-
erations; however, it bears a decisive imprint from the generation 
that enacted it. The constitutional moment thus might not be a 
sober one.21 Such a moment is often connected to an intensive 
experience. Prudent and far-sighted constitution-making in such 
a situation is nothing less than “audacious practice”.22
If we assume an ethical obligation to preserve the action 
space of the following generations, how should we 
account for this obligation in material constitutional 
provisions?
A constitution might matter for several generations; 
however, it bears a decisive imprint from the generation 
that enacted it. The constitutional moment thus might 
not be a sober one.
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a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all 
perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained 
in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between 
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who 
are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each 
particular state is but a clause in the great primæval contract of 
eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connect­
ing the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact 
sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and 
all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not 
subject to the will of those, who by an obligation above them, and 
infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law. 
The municipal corporations of that universal kingdom are not 
morally at liberty at their pleasure, and on their speculations of 
a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder 
the bands of their subordinate community, and to dissolve it into 
an unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles. 
It is the first and supreme necessity only, a necessity that is not 
chosen, but chooses, a necessity paramount to deliberation, that 
admits no discussion, and demands no evidence, which alone can 
justify a resort to anarchy.33
In this longer quote, Burke speaks of the state as an all-encom-
passing “partnership” in an “eternal society”, in which “visible and 
invisible world” are connected. These principles are violated by 
revolution. As a politician Burke even argued for a military inter-
vention in France.34 One might disagree about whether Burke is a 
natural law theorist, a reactionary or a conservative.35 In any case, 
his actual conception is in many aspects not compatible with our 
contemporary idea of a rational constitutionalised state. It can 
hardly be deemed liberal. The possibility of thinking and acting 
freely has not much space in a “partnership in all virtue”. Burke 
describes the state as divine order. Such a state is not ours. The 
liberal constitutionalised state guarantees its citizens the freedom 
to act and think; it has to function without divine legitimation.36 
In short, Burke’s conception does not share the presumptions of 
modern constitution-making.37
This does not mean that Burke’s conception cannot spark an in-
teresting debate. A normative reinterpretation of Burke could lead 
to an as-if-benchmark useful for evaluating how well a constitu-
tion fares in the first intergenerational challenge: could the con-
stitution – if thought of as an intergenerational contract – be the 
result of negotiations, in which successive generations took part? 
The particular difficulty of this thought experiment lies in antic-
ipating the preferences of successive generations. A meaningful 
– and need-based38 - minimal consensus could be thought of, e.g., 
regarding “natural foundations of life”.39 Beyond such minimal 
consensus, we can only speculate which values matter to succes-
sive generations. We do not know. The accusation of a pretence of 
knowledge is easily raised.40
We still do not need to give up the contract metaphor completely. 
The idea of an offer has merit: The constitution-making generation 
offers a constitution to its successors. This constitution has to prove 
itself constantly and has to be recognised in practice. This bears 
a resemblance to Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s description of the 
deep problem of the constitutionalised state: it depends on condi-
tions that it cannot guarantee.41 Still constitutional designers can 
ask themselves the meaningful question: which design42 will make 
it more likely for successive generations to accept the offer?
Thomas Paine’s objection
A far more liberal (and, for our question, more constructive) per-
spective is taken by Thomas Paine, who fiercely contradicts Burke 
in a direct reply:
There never did, there never will, and there never can exist a 
parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, 
in any country, possessed of the right or the power of binding and 
controuling posterity to the “end of time,“ or of commanding for 
ever how the world shall be governed, or who shall govern it; 
and therefore, all such clauses, acts or declarations, by which the 
makers of them attempt to do what they have neither the right nor 
the power to do, nor the power to execute, are in themselves null 
and void.—Every age and generation must be as free to act for 
itself, in all cases, as the ages and generations which preceded it. 
The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave, is the 
most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property 
in man; neither has any generation a property in the generations 
which are to follow. The parliament or the people of 1688, or of 
any other period, had no more right to dispose of the people of the 
present day, or to bind or to controul them in any shape what­
ever, than the parliament or the people of the present day have 
to dispose of, bind or controul those who are to live a hundred or 
a thousand years hence. Every generation is, and must be, compe­
tent to all the purposes which its occasions require. It is the living, 
and not the dead, that are to be accommodated. When man ceases 
to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and having no 
longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no 
longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or 
how its government shall be organized, or how administered.43
Paine emphasises the role of the living and denies the legitimacy 
of eternal legislation. In a letter to James Madison, Thomas Jeffer-
son makes a similar statement: “no society can make a perpetual 
constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to 
the living generation.”44
The statements by Paine and Jefferson have a strong normative, 
but also a descriptive content. On the normative side, they pro-
pose that each generation has certain rights, in particular regard-
ing political self-determination.45 According to Paine, “every age 
and generation must be as free to act for itself.” On the descriptive 
side, they acknowledge that the influence of each generation is 
limited, as Paine speaks of the “right or the power [my emphasis] 
of binding and controuling [sic] posterity to the ‘end of time.’”
This is where the interpretation of “constitutions as fetters” is not 
consistent:46 One cannot loosen one’s fetters. Odysseus needed his 
companions to do it. But to be effective a constitution depends on 
the recognition by its addressees, the People. From a factual view-
point, the People can always exercise their constituent power and 
give themselves a new constitution,47 or just ignore the present 
one. A liberal constitution is not eternal.48 Whether it will prove 
itself is an open question.
Countermeasures
The measures taken on the level of constitutional design to 
The liberal constitutionalised state guarantees its 
citizens the freedom to act and think; it has to function 
without divine legitimation.
Intergenerational Justice Review
1/2017
35
 enhance the likelihood of a constitution’s acceptance need to 
strike a balance between substantive and procedural elements.
Substantive elements
First, there is a substantive side to meeting the intergeneration-
al challenge. The offer made to successive generations must have 
suitable legal substance.49 A constitution that is grossly unjust 
programmes social conflict and is not a suitable intergeneration-
al offer. What rather is needed is a material legal solution that 
protects fundamental rights and creates the basis for functioning 
statehood. Formulating a minimal content is a difficult task, but 
not unthinkable. Arguably, the basic characteristics of a minimal 
constitution consist in a limitation of state power, protection of 
the citizen’s rights, and practicable rules for democratic institu-
tions. One might also think of safeguarding democracy and the 
rule of law.50 Many designs are possible in the case of democratic 
institutions and government.51
But as uncertainty persists regarding future challenges and future 
generations’ preferences, this material side needs to be comple-
mented with procedural elements. These imply that the constitu-
tion-makers themselves do not know which substantive solutions 
will be realised by such means.52
Procedural elements
Notwithstanding a recently identified trend towards more spec-
ificity in constitutional documents,53 we can assume that consti-
tutions are rather general documents, with provisions that need 
to be interpreted. Thus, the “open texture of law”54 provides 
successive generations with some flexibility. This way, situations 
that were not foreseeable at the time of constitution-making can 
be covered. The need for interpretation creates a new problem: 
Which interpretation shall be decisive? Commonly, this dilemma 
is solved by entrusting a constitutional court with the task of in-
terpreting the law in light of current developments.55
Going one step further, one can allow for a constitution to be 
amendable.56 If mere interpretation does not suffice to keep the 
constitution up-to-date, the text can be adjusted to changed 
circumstance. The German Basic Law regulates its amendment 
procedure in Article 79. Amendment is tied to high thresholds: 
the two-thirds majority required by Article 79 (2) Basic Law in 
both parliament (Bundestag) and the representation of the federal 
states (Bundesrat) is not easily achieved. But there is more. In 
Article 79 (3) the Basic Law shields certain contents from being 
amended: “the division of the Federation into Länder, their par-
ticipation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles 
laid down in Articles 1 and 20”.57 This is the so-called eternity 
clause which has particular importance from an intergenerational 
perspective.
Eternity clause and constitutional assemblies
On the textual level, such an eternity clause conserves a specific 
constitutional content and shields it from amendment. The clause 
creates the seemingly paradoxical category of unconstitutional 
constitutional law. The clause aims at marking hidden breaches 
of the constitution. If the constitution is undermined, this can 
be made visible and described as such. The power to distinguish 
makes eternity clauses attractive. They are used more and more 
in constitutions around the globe.58 More often than not, they 
are shaped by painful experiences that have marked a societal 
transition.59 The later practical use of an eternity clause does not 
necessarily fall within the scope of what the constitution-mak-
er had foreseen. The experience that led to Article 79 (3) Basic 
Law was the undermining of the Weimar constitution by Nazism. 
Today, Article 79 (3) Basic Law is used by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court to mark the limits of European integration by way 
of so-called “identity control”.60 One may argue about the per-
suasiveness of this – potentially self-serving and political61 – juris-
prudence.62 In any case, European integration was not the object 
of the founders’ concerns when drafting the Basic Law. This 
 illustrates a possible functional change of constitutional 
 guarantees.
From the perspective of generational ethics, the use of eternity 
clauses seems like an appropriation: with which right does one 
generation deprive another from an option to act? From such a 
perspective, the solution of a “permanent constitutional assembly” 
seems appropriate.63 Recurring conventions would counterweigh 
the eternity clause and renew the constitution’s legitimacy. This 
is the idea of the connected “constitutional chains” mentioned 
at the beginning. This idea has the merit that it recognises the 
need for a democratic foundation of a constitution. However, it 
overestimates the force of eternity clauses and at the same time 
underestimates the risks of an institution rivalling the written 
constitution.
Eternity clauses express the idea that certain values were of par-
amount importance to the founders. But the word “eternity” 
should not fool us. With good cause the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany speaks of the “so-called eternity guarantee”.64 
The normative force of such an eternity clause cannot exceed the 
normative force that a constitution generally has due to the recog-
nition by its addressees. This does not mean that a constitutional 
amendment contrary to Article 79 (3) Basic Law would be simple 
to realise. It means that the actual opposition to such an endeav-
our depends on how the eternity clause is perceived and valued in 
practice. In fact, at least in Germany, the clause is valued highly. 
For the idea of an eternal constitutional core this is essential. As 
already mentioned, Dreier recognises a concerning trend of “pet-
rifications”. Dreier speaks of a “sacralisation” and emphasises the 
need for a rational approach to the constitution that limits power, 
but does not contain eternal truth.65 A constitutional assembly 
that expresses that a constitution is not set in stone could be a 
remedy to such tendencies.
A constitutional assembly can be organised in many different 
ways.66 If it is planned and designed from scratch, however, it 
will always lack the special historic moment that has helped most 
constitutions achieve legitimacy. One might consider whether a 
constitutional assembly was necessary after German reunifica-
tion. The Basic Law was designed as a provisional solution. In 
this sense, it was designed to trigger a debate about its very self 
The [eternity] clause aims at marking hidden breaches of 
the constitution. If the constitution is undermined, this 
can be made visible and described as such.
From a factual viewpoint, the People can always exercise 
their constituent power and give themselves a new 
constitution, or just ignore the present one. A liberal 
constitution is not eternal.
Intergenerational Justice Review
1/2017
36
in the moment of reunification. For reasons of feasibility, mixed 
with political prejudice, unified Germany did not enact a new 
constitution. Still, the historic moment was there. Without such a 
moment, constitution-making can be difficult.67
There is a stronger argument against permanent, or regularly 
recurring, constitutional assemblies. It builds on the aforemen-
tioned description of how a constitution functions, and where 
its limitations lie. As an institution, a constitution depends on 
its broad acceptance by its addressees. Enforcement is decentral-
ised. Society must – at least with a critical majority – enforce the 
constitution collectively against a transgressor. Which rules and 
values should be upheld, though? If society wants stability, it has 
to agree on a body of such rules and values. The constitution in 
the form of a respected document gives the necessary reference 
point.68 Legitimacy and dignity of the institution “Constitution” 
underline it.69 To say it with Thomas Schelling: They add sali-
ence.70 This is where the force of a constitution lies. It provides a 
strong reference point for what the values of a society are. From 
the perspective of positive political theory, it solves a coordination 
problem.71 This function becomes paramount in moments of cri-
sis. In such unforeseeable situations, the force of the constitution 
should not be weakened. A constituent assembly that is active in 
parallel, and potentially strongly legitimised, might create a com-
peting institution that may undermine this force. On the other 
hand, in times of (relative) political calm, a constituent assembly 
might again bring about the societal divisions that the constitu-
tion tried to overcome.72
A constitution is so important that it seems ill-advised to weak-
en its force just as a matter of principle by creating a competing 
institution. In a constituent assembly, the constituent power is 
activated. This raises the question how a formally valid consti-
tution will be perceived, if a parallel constituent assembly is in 
process. It cannot be safely assumed that politics would continue 
to respect the formally valid document. If the assembly discusses 
a change of competences between government bodies, this would 
cast a shadow on how these competences are exercised under the 
valid constitution. And political forces could use the opportunity 
of a majority in a constitutional assembly to entrench their inter-
ests. Constitutional assemblies typically mark transitions. Taking 
the aforementioned risks into account, the wiser choice suggests 
avoiding permanent constitutional assemblies.
Against the background of the dangers that are associated with 
such a concept, we can think about less severe means to check 
whether a constitution is in need of reform. Commissions that 
check for this need without employing constituent power are one 
example. Such commissions, and a scientific discourse on the 
shape of the constitution, are well underway.73
Open and flexible interpretation
This does not mean that legitimacy and its renewal should not 
concern us. A means less severe than permanent constitutional 
assemblies can be found in an open, flexible and, most impor-
tantly, rational approach to existing constitutional provisions. It 
seems that constitutions are well aware of their limitations. The 
(extended) Call for Papers for the 8th Intergenerational Justice 
Prize points to a historic example, the French Constitution of 24 
June 1793, which never entered into force.74 There, the “right to 
revolution” was explicitly acknowledged. Article 28 read: 
“Un peuple a toujours le droit de revoir, de réformer et de changer 
sa Constitution. Une génération ne peut pas assujettir à ses lois les 
générations futures.”
The statement that a generation always has the right to “revise, 
reform, and change” its constitution seems paradoxical in a con-
stitution that aims at endurance. But this is not a singular historic 
oddity. We find similar clauses even today in constitutions. The 
last provision of the German Basic Law, Article 146, reads: 
This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and 
freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall 
cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted 
by the German people takes effect.75
The relevance of Article 146 Basic Law is a fiercely debated issue in 
German constitutional scholarship.76 The history of the preceding 
provision,77 which naturally lacked the reference to reunification, 
was influenced by the division of Germany and Allied occupation. 
It was supposed to open the door to a constitution-making pro-
cess free of such constraints. As reunification was realised by the 
new federal states of former Eastern Germany acceding to Western 
Germany,78 a significant part of German constitutional scholars 
treats it as obsolete, if not dangerous.79 This view is not uncontest-
ed. Dreier recognises the potential of Article 146 Basic Law. He 
speaks of the “normative bridge” that Article 146 Basic Law can 
provide and of how Article 146 Basic Law dispenses with the need 
for revolution.80 Accordingly, Article 146 Basic Law allows for a 
transition to a constitution that is designed differently than the 
eternity clause would allow.81 This is particularly relevant for a con-
stitutional development that may want to continue the tradition of 
the Basic Law, while at the same time doing specific things differ-
ently. Such a development need not take place in the near future. 
But the possibility of such development should not be excluded. 
In regard to our question of intergenerational constitutional stabil-
ity, Article 146 Basic Law bears an intriguing potential. The con-
stitution leaves the possibility open to be developed further, thus 
leaving more choices to successive generations. This could indeed 
mitigate “reactance”.82 In accordance to the old Article 146 Basic 
Law, the Basic Law put its own abolishment on the table in the pro-
cess of German reunification. The possibility of abolishment could 
have benefited its endurance, as after an intense debate the result 
was in fact the affirmation of the existing Basic Law.83 However, a 
challenge to this reasoning can be found in the United Kingdom’s 
“Brexit” vote, where the vulnerability of the Union – expressed in 
the option to leave it in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty of 
the European Union – worked to its detriment. This case cannot 
be covered here,84 but it should motivate us to taken an even closer 
look at the conditions of institutional stability.85
The normative force of […] an eternity clause cannot 
exceed the normative force that a constitution generally 
has due to the recognition by its addressees.
A means less severe than permanent constitutional 
assemblies can be found in an open, flexible and, most 
importantly, rational approach to existing constitutional 
provisions.
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Conclusion and outlook
I have argued that a flexible and rational approach to a constitu-
tion’s limitations can benefit a constitution’s success. This is an 
argument for treating such a provision as Article 146 Basic Law 
as a counterweight to the eternity clause. The possibility of adapt-
ing the constitution to new challenges remains open to successive 
generations that want to continue, and build on, a constitutional 
tradition. This might already have a stabilising effect today. How-
ever, there are limits to this argument. Indeed, the question of 
how a flexible approach that is open to future development affects 
the acceptance and thus the stability of a constitution cannot be 
answered with legal methodology alone.86 
Empirical research can put our intuitions to the test. Quantita-
tive studies suggest that inclusiveness as well as a certain level of 
flexibility predict a constitution’s endurance.87 This literature is 
already rich and still growing. But causal inference is particularly 
difficult in the constitutional setting.88 This calls for complemen-
tary perspectives. Typically, such a perspective can come from case 
studies. A more daring approach that is worth exploring can be 
found in laboratory decision experiments, that are designed to 
tackle the identification problem.89 The behavioural mechanisms 
identified in experimental studies could be contrasted with the 
insights from field data studies.90 New experiments could be de-
signed to model the problems faced by constitution-makers. This 
exercise could further inspire the noblest task of constitutional 
designers: creating institutions that help bring about a civic sense 
of solidarity.91
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